The idea of the Cold War as a propaganda contest as opposed to a military conflict is being increasingly accepted. This has led to a re-evaluation of the relationship between economic policies, political agendas and cultural activities in Western Europe post 1945.

This book provides an important cross-section of case studies that highlight the connections between overt/covert activities and cultural/political agendas during the early Cold War. It therefore provides a valuable bridge between diplomatic and intelligence research and represents an important contribution towards our understanding of the significance and consequences of this linkage for the shaping of post-war democratic societies.

As a fully documented study of a Second World War Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) operative, Our Man in Yugoslavia is absolutely unique.

Its subject is Owen Reed, an army officer recruited into SIS in the summer of 1943 and then parachuted in to German-occupied Croatia to work with Tito's Partisans and other Allied secret organisations. After reporting back to London in July 1944, Reed returned to Yugoslavia to find relations with the Partisans deteriorating. His erstwhile comrades began working against him and the intelligence he passed to the SIS came increasingly to focus on the communist takeover. Reed found himself at the centre of the first great confrontation of the Cold War.

Blending biography and operational history, Our Man in Yugoslavia is a remarkable case study, illustrating how SIS operatives were recruited and trained, and describing their work in detail.

Professor Sheldon uses the modern concept of the intelligence cycle to trace intelligence activities in Rome whether they were done by private citizens, the government, or the military.

Examining a broad range of activities the book looks at the many types of espionage tradecraft that have left their traces in the ancient sources:

* intelligence and counterintelligence gathering
* covert action
* clandestine operations
* the use of codes and ciphers

Dispelling the myth that such activities are a modern invention, Professor Sheldon explores how these ancient spy stories have modern echoes as well. What is the role of an intelligence service in a free republic? When do the security needs of the state outweigh the rights of the citizen? If we cannot trust our own security services, how safe can we be? Although protected by the Praetorian Guard, seventy-five percent of Roman emperors died by assassination or under attack by pretenders to his throne. Who was guarding the guardians?

For students of Rome, and modern social studies too - this will provide a fascinating read.

This fascinating new collection of essays on Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) explores the ‘non-military’ aspects of British special operations in the Second World War.

It details how SOE was established in the summer of 1940 to ‘set Europe ablaze’, as Churchill memorably put it. This was a task it was meant to achieve by detonating popular resistance against Axis rule, and nurturing ‘secret armies’, which might be capable of providing military and other forms of assistance for British forces when they were once again able to return to the offensive and conduct land operations in Europe.

The importance of the collection, however, goes beyond merely illuminating aspects of SOE’s work which have largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. More significantly, by situating SOE within the context of Britain’s broader political needs, the essays demonstrate the extent to which SOE came to epitomise and embody the range of skills that are found in today’s secret service organisations. SOE showed itself capable of operating on a global scale and developing the necessary expertise, equipment and personnel to conduct activities across the whole spectrum of what we have come to know as ‘covert operations’. By bringing SOE’s activities into sharper focus and exposing the scale of its involvement in Britain’s wartime external relations, the essays echo current thinking on the place of the so-called ‘secret world’ in international politics.

A new look at how Britain’s defence establishment learned to engage Japan’s armed forces as the Pacific War progressed.

Douglas Ford reveals that, prior to Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the British held a contemptuous view of Japanese military prowess. He shows that the situation was not helped by the high level of secrecy which surrounded Japan’s war planning, as well as the absence of prior engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army.

The fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ in February 1942 dispelled the notion that the Japanese were incapable of challenging the West. British military officials acknowledged how their forces in the Far East were inadequate, and made a concerted effort to improve their strength and efficiency. However, because Britain’s forces were tied down in their operations in Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean, they had to fight the Japanese with limited resources. Drawing upon the lessons obtained through Allied experiences in the Pacific theatres as well as their own encounters in Southeast Asia, the British used the available intelligence on the strategy, tactics and morale of Japan’s armed forces to make the best use of what they had, and by the closing stages of the war in 1944 to 1945, they were able to devise a war plan which paved the way for the successful war effort.

This book will be of great interest to all students of the Second World War, intelligence studies, British military history and strategic studies in general.

This is the first major study in English of Fascist Italy’s overseas propaganda. Using rare Italian and French captured documents, this is also the first investigation into the relationship between Mussolini’s regime and Arab nationalist movements

This new account covers propaganda and subversive activities engineered by the Italian government in the Mediterranean and the Middle East from 1935 until 1940, when Italy entered the war. It assesses the nature of the challenge brought by the Fascist regime to British security and colonial interests in the region.

Fascist propaganda, in particular in the Arab Middle East, must be regarded as an expression of Mussolini’s foreign policy and his attempts to build an Italian empire that would stretch beyond the Mediterranean, gaining control over the exits, Gibraltar and Suez, which were in the hands of the British and the French.

The activities of individual agents and organizations are carefully reconstructed and analyzed to highlight the seemingly contradictory objectives of the Italian government: on the one hand, Rome was courting the Arab nationalist movements in Egypt and Palestine, which were seeking the support of external forces capable of providing political, financial and military backing needed to overthrow foreign rulers; on the other, the regime was promoting further territorial expansion in Africa. These aspects build into an excellent picture of this fascinating period of modern history.

This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of politics, media, Italian history and propaganda.

This new book examines the construction, activities and impact of the network of US state and private groups in the Cold War.

By moving beyond state-dominated, ‘top-down’ interpretations of international relations and exploring instead the engagement and mobilization of whole societies and cultures, it presents a radical new approach to the study of propaganda and American foreign policy and redefines the relationship between the state and private groups in the pursuit and projection of American foreign relations.

In a series of valuable case studies, examining relationships between the state and women’s groups, religious bodies, labour, internationalist groups, intellectuals, media and students, this volume explores the construction of a state-private network not only as a practical method of communication and dissemination of information or propaganda, but also as an ideological construction, drawing upon specifically American ideologies of freedom and voluntarism. The case studies also analyze the power-relationship between the state and private groups, assessing the extent to which the state was in control of the relationship, and the extent to which private organizations exerted their independence.

This book will be of great interest to students of Intelligence Studies, Cold War History and IR/security studies in general.

This is a new evaluation of the role, dynamics and challenges of intelligence in peacekeeping activities and its place in a much wider social, economic and political context.

It assesses the role of coalition forces, law enforcement agencies, development institutions, and non-governmental organisations who have become partners in peace support activities.

Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI) is a new form of intelligence stressing predominantly open sources of information used to create Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and that demands multi-lateral sharing of intelligence at all levels. Unlike national intelligence, which emphasizes spies, satellites, and secrecy, PKI brings together many aspects of intelligence gathering including the media and NGOs. It seeks to establish standards in open source collection, analysis, security, counterintelligence and training and produces unclassified intelligence useful to the public. The challenges facing peacekeeping intelligence are increasingly entwined with questions of arms control, commercial interests, international crime, and ethnic conflict.

This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of military and security studies, intelligence and peacekeeping.

John Ferris' work in strategic and intelligence history is widely praised for its originality and the breadth of its research. At last his major pioneering articles are now available in this one single volume.

In Intelligence and Strategy these essential articles have been fundamentally revised to incorporate new evidence and information withheld by governments when they were first published. This volume reshapes the study of communications intelligence by tracing Britain's development of cipher machines providing the context to Ultra and Enigma, and by explaining how British and German signals intelligence shaped the desert war. The author also explains how intelligence affected British strategy and diplomacy from 1874 to 1940 and world diplomacy during the 1930s and the Second World War. Finally he traces the roots for contemporary intelligence, and analyzes intelligence and the RMA as well as the role of intelligence in the 2003 Gulf War.
This volume ultimately brings new light to our understanding of the relations between intelligence, strategy and diplomacy between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

This book is a fascinating new examination of one of the most feared and efficient secret services the world has ever known, the Stasi.

The East German Stasi was a jewel among the communist secret services, the most trusted by its Russian mother organization the KGB, and even more efficient. In its attempt at ‘total coverage’ of civil society, the Ministry for State Security came close to realizing the totalitarian ideal of a political police force. Based on research in archival files unlocked just after the fall of the Berlin Wall and available to few German and Western readers, this volume details the Communist Party’s attempt to control all aspects of East German civil society, and sets out what is known of the regime’s support for international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s.

STASI will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, German politics and international relations.

Based on recently declassified documents, this book provides the first examination of the Truman Administration’s decision to employ covert operations in the Cold War.

Although covert operations were an integral part of America’s arsenal during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the majority of these operations were ill conceived, unrealistic and ultimately doomed to failure. In this volume, the author looks at three central questions: Why were these types of operations adopted? Why were they conducted in such a haphazard manner? And, why, once it became clear that they were not working, did the administration fail to abandon them?

The book argues that the Truman Administration was unable to reconcile policy, strategy and operations successfully, and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the Cold War. This ensured that they wasted time and effort, money and manpower on covert operations designed to challenge Soviet hegemony, which had little or no real chance of success.

US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, Cold War history, intelligence and international history in general.

This edited volume brings together many of the world’s leading scholars of intelligence with a number of former senior practitioners to facilitate a wide-ranging dialogue on the central challenges confronting students of intelligence.

The book presents a series of documents, nearly all of which are published here for the first time, accompanied by both overview and commentary sections. The central objectives of this collection are twofold. First, it seeks to build on existing scholarship on intelligence in deepening our understanding of its impact on a series of key events in the international history of the past century. Further, it aims to explore the different ways in which intelligence can be studied by bringing together both scholarly and practical expertise to examine a range of primary material relevant to the history of intelligence since the early twentieth century.

This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence, strategic and security studies, foreign policy and international history.

This edited book examines the East German foreign intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, or HVA) as a historical problem, covering politics, scientific-technical and military intelligence and counterintelligence.

The contributors broaden the conventional view of East German foreign intelligence as driven by the inter-German conflict to include its targeting of the United States, northern European and Scandinavian countries, highlighting areas that have previously received scant attention, like scientific-technical and military intelligence. The CIA’s underestimation of the HVA was a major intelligence failure. As a result, East German intelligence served as a stealth weapon against the US, West German and NATO targets, acquiring the lion’s share of critical Warsaw Pact intelligence gathered during the Cold War. This book explores how though all of the CIA’s East German sources were double agents controlled by the Ministry of State Security, the CIA was still able to declare victory in the Cold War. Themes and topics that run through the volume include the espionage wars; the HVA's relationship with the Russian KGB; successes and failures of the BND (West German Federal Intelligence Service) in East Germany; the CIA and the HVA; the HVA in countries outside of West Germany; disinformation and the role and importance of intelligence gathering in East Germany.

This book will be of much interest to students of East Germany, Intelligence Studies, Cold War History and German politics in general.

Kristie Macrakis is Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Thomas Wegener Friis is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Denmark’s Centre for Cold War Studies. Helmut Müller-Enbergs is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of Southern Denmark and holds a tenured senior staff position at the German Federal Commission for the STASI Archives in Berlin.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of UK-US intelligence cooperation in the post-9/11 world.

Seeking to connect an analysis of intelligence liaison with the wider realm of Anglo-American Relations, the book draws on a wide range of interviews and consultations with key actors in both countries. The book is centred around two critical and empirical case studies, focusing on the interactions on the key issues of counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counter-proliferation. These case studies provide substantive insights into a range of interactions such as 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings, the A.Q. Khan nuclear network, the prelude to the 2003 Iraq War, extraordinary rendition and special forces deployments. Drawing on over 60 interviews conducted in the UK and US with prominent decision-makers and practitioners, these issues are examined in the contemporary historical context, with the main focus being on the years 2000-05.

This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, foreign policy, security studies and International Relations in general.

Adam Svendsen has a Phd in International History from the University of Warwick. He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, and has contributed to the International Security Programme at Chatham House and to the work of IISS, London.